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Abstract Negotiation with multiple interdependent issues is an important problem
since much of real-world negotiation falls into this category. This paper examines
the problem that, in such domains, agent utility functions are nonlinear, and thereby
can create nonconvex Pareto frontiers. This in turn implies that the Nash Bargaining
Solution, which has been viewed as the gold standard for identifying a unique opti-
mal negotiation outcome, does not serve that role in nonlinear domains. In nonlinear
domains, unlike linear ones, there can be multiple Nash Bargaining Solutions, and
all can be sub-optimal with respect to social welfare and fairness. In this paper, we
propose a novel negotiation protocol called SFMP (the Secure and Fair Mediator Pro-
tocol) that addresses this challenge, enabling secure multilateral negotiations with fair
and pareto-optimal outcomes in nonlinear domains. The protocol works by (1) using
nonlinear optimization, combined with a Multi-Party protocol, to find the Pareto front
without revealing agent’s private utility information, and (2) selecting the agreement
from the Pareto set that maximizes a fair division criterion we call approximated fair-
ness. We demonstrate that SFMP is able to find agreements that maximize fairness
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and social welfare in nonlinear domains, and out-performs (in terms of outcomes and
scalability) previously developed nonlinear negotiation protocols.
Keywords Multi-issue negotiation · Nonlinear utility function · Fairness
1 Introduction
Negotiation is an important aspect of daily life and represents an important topic in
the field of multi-agent systems research. There has been extensive work in the area
of automated negotiation; that is, where automated agents negotiate with other agents
in such contexts as e-commerce (Kraus 2001), large scale argumentation (Malone
et al. 2007), collaborative design, and so on. Even though many contributions have
been made in this area (Bosse and Jonker 2005; Faratin et al. 2002; Fatima et al.
2004; Soh and Li 2004) most have dealt exclusively with negotiations involving one
or more independent issues with simple (linear) utility functions. Many real-world
negotiations, however, are more complex, involving interdependent issues and there-
fore, nonlinear utility functions. When designers work together to design a car, for
example, the utility of a given carburetor choice is highly dependent on which engine
is chosen. The key impact of such issue dependencies is that they result in agent utility
functions that are nonlinear, i.e., that have multiple optima. Most existing negotiation
protocols, though well-suited for linear utility functions, work poorly when applied to
nonlinear problems (Klein et al. 2003).
The Nash bargaining solution, which maximizes the product of the agent utilities,
is a well-known metric that provably identifies the optimal (fair and social-welfare-
maximizing) agreement for negotiations in linear domains (Kaneko 1980; Binmore
et al. 1986; Nash 1950). In nonlinear domains, however, the Pareto frontier will often
not satisfy the convexity assumption required to make the Nash solution optimal and
unique (Denicolo and Mariotti 2000; Kaneko 1980; Nash 1950). There can, in other
words, be multiple agreements in nonlinear domains that satisfy the Nash Bargain-
ing Solution, and many or all of these will have sub-optimal fairness and/or social
welfare. We need, therefore, a new approach if we want to produce good outcomes
for nonlinear negotiations.
In this paper, we present a secure mediated protocol (the Secure and Fair Mediator
Protocol, or SFMP) that addresses this challenge. The protocol consists of two main
steps. In the first step, SFMP uses a nonlinear optimizer, integrated with a secure
information sharing technique called the Multi-Party Protocol (Shamir 1979), to find
the Pareto front without causing agents to reveal private utility information. In the
second step, an agreement is selected from the set of Pareto-optimal contracts using a
metric, which we call approximate fairness, that measures how equally the total utility
is divided across the negotiating agents (Robertson 1998 etc.). We demonstrate that
SFMP produces better scalability and social welfare values than previous nonlinear
negotiation protocols.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we describe a model of
nonlinear negotiation with utility functions based on constraints, and show how the
Nash Bargaining Solution can lead to sub-optimal results in such contexts. Second,
123
A Secure and Fair Protocol that Addresses Weaknesses 31
we describe a new protocol (SFMP) designed to address this challenge. Finally, we
present the experimental results, describe related work, and draw conclusions.
2 Negotiation with Nonlinear Utility Functions
We consider the situation where n agents want to reach an agreement with a mediator
who manages the negotiation from a man-in-the-middle position. There are M issues
S = {s1, . . . , sM } to be negotiated. The number of issues represents the number of
dimensions in the utility space. The issues are shared: all agents are potentially inter-
ested in the values for all M issues. Each issue s j has a value drawn from the domain
of integers [0, X ], i.e., s j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , X}(1 ≤ j ≤ M).1 A contract is represented by
a vector of issue values s = (s1, . . . , sM ). We assume that agents have an incentive to
cooperate to achieve win-win agreements because a non-agreement has lower utility
than an agreement.
An agent’s utility function, in our formulation, is described in terms of constraints.
There are l constraints, ck ∈ C . Each constraint represents a region in the contract
space with one or more dimensions and an associated utility value. Constraint ck has
value wi (ck, s) if and only if it is satisfied by contract s(1 ≤ k ≤ l). Every agent has
its own, typically unique, set of constraints.
An agent’s utility for contract s is defined as the sum of the utility for all the
constraints it satisfies, i.e., as ui (s) = ∑ck∈C,s∈x(ck) wi (ck, s), where x(ck) is a set
of possible contracts (solutions) of ck . This expression produces a “bumpy” nonlin-
ear utility function with high points where many constraints are satisfied and lower
regions where few or no constraints are satisfied. This represents a crucial departure
from previous efforts on multi-issue negotiation, where contract utility is calculated
as the weighted sum of the utilities for individual issues, producing utility functions
shaped like flat hyper planes with a single optimum.
Figure 1 shows an example of a utility function generated via a collection of binary
constraints involving Issues 1 and 2. Constraint A, for example, which has a value of
55, holds if the value for Issue 1 is in the range [3,7] and the value for Issue 2 is in the
range [4,6]. The utility function is highly nonlinear with many hills and valleys. For
our work, we assume that many real-world utility functions are more complex than
this, involving more than two issues as well as higher-order (e.g., trinary and quater-
nary) constraints. In recent work (e.g., Marsa-Maestre et al. 2009a), several types of
constraints were proposed.
This constraint-based utility function representation allows us to capture the issue
interdependencies common in real world negotiations. Constraint A, for example,
captures the fact that a value of 4 is desirable for issue 1 if issue 2 has the value 4, 5
or 6. Note, however, that this representation is also capable of capturing linear util-
ity functions as a special case (they can be captured as a series of unary constraints).
1 A discrete domain can come arbitrarily close to a real domain by increasing its size. As a practical matter,
many real-world issues that are theoretically ‘real’ numbers (delivery date, cost) are discretized during
negotiations.
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Fig. 1 An example of a nonlinear utility function generated using constraints
A negotiation protocol for complex contracts can, therefore, also handle simple (linear)
contract negotiations.
Working in the nonlinear domain has a number of important impacts on the
kind of negotiation protocols that can be effective. First, consider parero-optimality.
Pareto-optimality is widely recognized as a basic requirement for a good negotiation
outcome. It is defined as follows: Contract s = (s1, . . . , sM ) is Pareto optimal if
there is no s′ such that ui (s ′) > ui (s) for all agents (ui (s) is agent i’s utility value).
Pareto-optimality thus eliminates all contracts where there are others that are better for
all the parties involved. In a linear negotiation (i.e., where the agent utility functions
are defined as the weighted sum of the values for each issue), it is computationally
trivial to find the Pareto front, and the social welfare (sum of agent utilities) for every
contract on the Pareto frontier is the same. In fact, the Pareto-optimal frontier for a
negotiation will be “sparse” in our model, i.e., the Pareto-optimal contracts points will
be few in number and widely scattered.
Next, let us consider fairness. Fairness is critical in bargaining theory because some
experimental results suggest that it deeply influences human decision-making (Ken
et al. 75 etc.) in such contexts as family decision making (e.g., where will we go on
our next vacation?), the less formal economy of consumer transactions (such as ticket
scalpers or flea markets), and price setting for consumer purchases. The ultimatum
game is a popular example of this effect (Alvard 2004; Bolton 1991). People tend
to offer “fair” (i.e., 50:50) splits, and offers less than 20% are often rejected in this
game, even though it is irrational in this game to reject any deal, since the alternative
is a zero payoff. There are many other studies about the relationship between decision
making and “fairness” in the experimental economics and behavioral economics fields
(Keeney and Raiffa 1993; Werner et al. 1982).
The Nash Bargaining Solution (i.e., the contract that maximizes the “Nash
product” = the product of the agent’s utility functions) is a widely-used approach
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Fig. 2 The relationship of nash product, fairness and social welfare in a linear utility function
for identifying the most “fair” contract from those that make up the Pareto front. As
we can see in Fig. 2, the Nash Bargaining Solution divides utility equally amongst the
negotiating parties, in a linear domain. It can be proven, in fact, that there is a unique
Nash bargaining solution for negotiations with convex pareto fronts, which is satisfied
trivially for negotiations with linear utilities (Nash 1950).2
These properties change radically in nonlinear negotiation. As we can see in
Fig. 3, when agents have nonlinear utility functions, the Pareto front can be non-
convex (Myerson 1991). There can be multiple Nash bargaining solutions, even with
continuous issue domains, and some of the Nash bargaining solutions may be non-
optimal in terms of social welfare and fair division of utility. It is even straightfor-
ward to find nonlinear cases where all the contracts on the Pareto front are Nash
bargaining solutions, despite the fact that many of them diverge widely from max-
imal fairness and social welfare. The Nash Bargaining Solution concept, which is
widely used as a basis for negotiation protocols for linear domains, will thus often
fare poorly in nonlinear domains. We need, therefore, to find negotiation proto-
cols that can achieve high social welfare and fairness values with nonlinear agent
utilities.
2 In negotiations with discretized issue domains, there can be multiple Nash Bargaining Solutions, but they
will all be clustered right next to each other and thus offer very similar fairness values.
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Fig. 3 The relationship of nash product, fairness and social welfare in a nonlinear utility function
3 Secure and Fair Mediator Protocol with Approximated Fairness
The Secure and Fair Mediator Protocol (SFMP) was defined to achieve these goals
while also protecting agent’s private utility information. SFMP consists of two main
steps: (1) finding the set of Pareto-optimal contracts, and (2) selecting a fair contract
from that set. These steps are defined below.
3.1 Finding the Pareto Front
This step is achieved using a mediated approach Fujita et al. (2008a, 2009). One or
more mediators propose contracts, initially randomly generated, and ask the agents
which ones they prefer. The mediators use this preference information to provide the
objective function for a nonlinear optimization technique such as simulated annealing
or a genetic algorithm. Over the course of multiple rounds, the mediators converge
on the set of pareto-optimal contracts. We assume, as is common in negotiation con-
texts, that agents prefer not to share their utility functions with others, in order to
preserve a competitive edge. Accordingly, our protocol uses a Multi-Party Protocol
Shamir (1979) to ensure that mediators can calculate the sum of the agents’ utilities
without learning, or revealing. the individual agents’ utility information. A detailed
explanation of the Multi-Party Protocol is given in “Appendix 1”.
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3.2 Selecting the Final Agreement
SFMP selects the final agreement from the Pareto-optimal contract set by calculat-
ing which one is the most fair. Several definitions of “fair” have been identified in
social choice and game theory Robertson (1998). Suppose we have a division X =
X1 ∪·∪ Xn among n agents where agent i receives Xi . “SImple” fair division results if
ui (Xi ) ≥ 1/n whenever 1 ≤ i ≤ n (each agent gets at least 1/n.) Another definition,
from game theory, calls a division X is fair if and only if it is Pareto-optimal and
envy-free (Chevaleyre et al. 2007). A division is “envy-free” if no agent feels another
has a strictly larger piece of the utility (Robertson 1998).
We adopt simple fair division as our concept of fairness. Contract agreements,
in general, rarely fully satisfy this condition. We measure, accordingly, how close an
agreement is to simple fair division by calculating its “approximated fairness”, i.e., the
deviation of each agent’s utility from the average of the total utility. The approximate
fairness of a contract is defined, formally, as follows:
V (u1, . . . , un) =
n∑
i=1
(ui − u)2
n
(u1, . . . , un : agent’s utility value in contract, u: the average of all agent’s utility
value).
An ideal contract, therefore, has an approximated fairness value of zero, and all
other contracts will have larger values. The final agreement selected by our protocol
is the contract from the Pareto-optimal set with the smallest approximated fairness
value.
Note that our fairness concept is equivalent to the Nash bargaining solution in
linear contexts with continuous issue domains. Assume that u1 + u2 + · · · + un =
K (constant) (where ui : agent i’s utility value). The Nash product is maximized when
u1 = u2 = · · · = un = K/n (this has been proven mathematically in the field of Iso-
perimetric Problems). The key difference is that our measure generalizes to nonlinear
domains. Approximated fairness does not, however, correspond to the Kalai-Smoro-
dinsky solution because the latter isn’t always fair (Thomson 1992).
4 Experiments
We ran a series of negotiation simulation experiments in order to demonstrate the
weaknesses of the Nash Bargaining Solution in nonlinear domains, and to compare
the performance of the SFMP protocol we defined against that of previous approaches.
The subsections below describe the experiment setup and results.
4.1 Detailed Description of Secure and Fair Mediator Protocol (SFMP)
The SFMP protocol utilizes multiple mediators in order to help assure agent privacy.
We assume that there are k = mn mediators M j and n agents (Ai ), where m is an
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arbitrary integer. Note that this approach requires that m is relatively high if we wish
to effectively conceal the agent’s private information. If the number of mediators is
low, the chances increase that all of the mediators will collude, and thus compromise
the agent’s privacy.
(Optional Pre-Negotiation Step) Contract space division among mediators: The
mediators divide the contract space between them, so each mediator searches a dif-
ferent subregion. Suppose, for example, that there are two issues whose domain is the
integers from 0 to 10. In this case, mediator 1 can manage the region of values 0–5
for issue 1 and values 0–10 for issue 2, while mediator 2 can manage the region of
values 6–10 for issue 1 and values 0–10 for issue 2. This step is optional, but it has
the advantage of potentially reducing the time needed to search the contract space by
allowing parallel computation.
(Step 1) Secure search to find a Pareto-optimal contract set: Each mediator searches
its assigned portion of the contract space using a local search algorithm (Russell and
Norvig 2002). We employed Hill Climbing (HC), Simulated Annealing (SA), and
Genetic Algorithm (GA) in our experiments. In HC, an agent starts with a random
solution and, at each step, makes some random mutations and selects the one that causes
the greatest utility increase. When the algorithm cannot find any more improvements,
it terminates. In SA, each step of the SA algorithm replaces the current solution by
a randomly generated nearby contract, with a probability that depends on the change
in utility value and a global parameter T (the virtual temperature) that is gradually
decreased during the process. The agent moves almost randomly when the tempera-
ture is high, but acts increasingly like a hill climber as the temperature decreases. When
T is 0, the search is terminated. The advantage of SA is that it is able to avoid getting
stuck in the local optima that occur in nonlinear optimization problems, and often
finds more optimal solutions than hill climbing. GA is a search technique inspired
by evolutionary biology, using such techniques as inheritance, mutation, selection,
and crossover. Initially many individual contracts are randomly generated to form an
initial population. After that, at each step, a proportion of the existing population is
selected, based on their ‘fitness’ (i.e., utility values). Crossover and mutation is then
applied to these selections to generate the next generation of contracts. This process
is repeated until a termination condition has been reached. The objective function for
all these local search algorithms is the maximization of social welfare. At each search
step, the mediators determine the social welfare values by securely gather the utility
values for the current contract(s) from their assigned agents. We call this secure value
gathering.
(Step 2) Identify agreement: All mediators share the maximum value in their sub-
region of the contract space with all the other mediators. Based on that, they identify
the pareto-optimal contract set. The mediators then select the contract, in that set, that
minimizes the approximated fairness metric. This represents the final agreement for
that negotiation.
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4.2 Nash Product Maximization Search
For a comparison case, we used Nash Product Maximization Search (NPMS) to find
the Nash bargaining solution for our tests (Russell and Norvig 2002). Our implemen-
tation used simulated annealing to maximize the Nash product for the negotiating
agents, gathering their utility values using the secure multi-party protocol. Simulated
annealing has been shown to be very effective for nonlinear optimization tasks (Ito
et al. 2007). We can use the results of NPMS to assess the scale of the performance dec-
rement caused by using the Nash Bargaining Solution concept in nonlinear domains.
4.3 Settings
We conducted five experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach. In each
experiment, we ran 100 negotiations between agents with randomly generated util-
ity functions. The number of agents was six, and the number of mediators was four.
The mediators could calculate the sum of the agent’s utility if four mediators got
together. The search space was divided equally amongst the mediators. The domain
for the issue values was [0,9]. The constraints included 10 unary constraints, 5 binary
constraints, 5 trinary constraints, and so on (a unary constraint relates to one issue,
a binary constraint relates to two issues, and so on). The maximum value for a con-
straint was 100 × (number of issues). Constraints that satisfy many issues thus
have, on average, larger utility, which seems reasonable for many domains. In a meet-
ing scheduling domain, for example, higher order constraints concern more people
than lower order constraints, so they are more important. The maximum width for a
constraint was 7. The following constraints, for example, are all valid: Issue 1 = [2,6],
Issue 3 = [2, 9].
We compared the following negotiation protocols: SFMP (SA), SFMP (HC), SFMP
(GA), Nash Product Maximization Search (NPMS), Bidding-based protocol, and
Exhaustive Search.
(A) SFMP (SA): “SFMP (SA)” is SFMP using Simulated Annealing as the opti-
mization algorithm. The initial temperature was 50 degrees. The initial temperature
was 50 degree. For each iteration, the temperature decreased 0.1 degrees, resulting
in 500 iterations. 20 + (Number of issues) × 5 searches were conducted, with the
initial start point changed randomly for each search.
(B) SFMP (HC): “SFMP (HC)” is SFMP using Hill Climbing as the optimization
algorithm. We employed the random restart hill climbing mechanism (Russell and
Norvig 2002). 20 + (number of issues) × 5 searches were conducted, with the initial
start point changed randomly for each search.
(C) SFMP (GA): “SFMP (GA)” is SFMP using a Genetic Algorithm as the opti-
mization algorithm. The population size was 20 + (number of issues) × 5. We
employed a basic crossover method in which two parent individuals were combined
to produce two children (one-point crossover). The fitness function was the sum of
all agents’ (declared) utility. 500 iterations were conducted. Mutations happened
at very small probability. In a mutation, one of the issues in a contract vector was
randomly chosen and changed.
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Fig. 4 Comparison of social welfare
(D) Nash Product Maximization Search (NPMS): “Nash Product Maximization
Search” used SA to search for the Nash bargaining solution(s), i.e., for contracts that
maximize the Nash product. The initial temperature was 50 degrees. For each itera-
tion, the temperature decreased 0.1 degree, resulting in 500 iterations. 20 + (Number
of issues) × 5 searches were conducted , with the initial start point changed randomly
for each search. These settings are the same as those for SFMP (SA).
(E) Bidding-based protocol: “Bidding-based protocol” is the protocol proposed
in Ito et al. (2007). In this protocol, the number of samples taken during random
sampling is (number of issues) × 200. The threshold used to remove contract points
that have low utility is 200. The limitation on the number of bids per agent is
N√6, 400, 000 for N agents. This method fails to reach agreements if the num-
ber of issues is more than eight because this method has too much computational
complexity.
(F) Exhaustive Search: “Exhaustive search” is a centralized brute force algorithm
that traverse the entire contract search space to find the Pareto-optimal contract set.
The final contract was then selected using our approximated fairness measure. This
approach was only computationally practical when the number of issues was seven
or fewer.
Our code was implemented in Java 2 (1.5) and run on a core 2-duo processor iMac
with 1.0 GB memory on the Mac OS × 10.5 operating system.
4.4 Experimental Results
Figure 4 compares the social welfare achieved by these six methods. The evaluation
measure we used was the (social welfare for final agreement from method)/(social
welfare for final agreement from SFMP (SA)). As predicted, we found that SFMP
(SA) and SFMP (GA) performed better than NPMS, confirming our claim that the
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Fig. 5 Finding Pareto-optimal contracts
Nash Bargaining Solution produces sub-optimal outcomes when applied to nonlin-
ear negotiation. SFMP (SA) and SFMP (GA) had about equal performance. Neither
produced fully optimal results, reflecting the difficulty of performing optimization in
large nonlinear contract spaces. All the SFMP protocols performed better than the
Basic Bidding Protocol, which was hampered by the limit on the number of bids per
agent necessitated by the combinatorics of winner determination in this protocol. The
performance of SFMP (HC) decreased rapidly as the number of issues grew, because
hill climbing got stuck on local optima. The performance of SFMP (SA) and SFMP
(GA) did not decrease appreciably as the number of issues increased.
Figure 5 compares the number of Pareto-optimal contracts found by the six methods.
In this experiment, we limited the domain of each issue to [0,4], so all Pareto-optimal
contracts could found, in a reasonable amount of time, using the exhaustive search algo-
rithm. We found that SFMP(SA) and SFMP(GA) were better at finding Pareto-optimal
contracts than either the Nash Product Maximization Search or the Biddiing-Based
Protocol. This makes sense, since the SFMP was explicitly designed to find the entire
Pareto front first, before selecting a final agreement, while the other protocols were
not. We also found that SFMP(SA) and SFMP(GA) performed better than the bidding-
based protocol, because the latter often fails to find Pareto-optimal solutions due to
the limit on the number of bids allowed by each agent. As always, the performance of
SFMP (HC) decreased rapidly as the number of issues grew. SFMP (GA)” showed the
highest performance on this measure, because GA is inherently more suitable for find-
ing Pareto-optimal contract sets. However, for all methods, when the number of issues
increased, the percentage of pareto-optimal contracts found decreased drastically.
Figure 6 assessed fairness by comparing the variance of the agent’s utilities for the
final agreements, across the six methods. Lower variance is better, because it means that
utility is distributed more fairly across the agents. The SFMP protocols showed better
performance than the “Bidding-based Protocol” on this measure because the basic
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Fig. 6 Comparison of variance
bidding protocol doesn’t consider fairness when finding agreements. SFMP (GA)
showed the lowest (best) value among the SFMP variants. NPMS outperformed the
SFMPs on this measure. This is counter to what we predicted: in nonlinear domains,
we would expect the Nash bargaining solutions to vary widely in their fairness values,
causing NPMS to produce, on the average, sub-optimal fairness values.
We can potentially explain these results by considering the allocation of compu-
tational effort in nonlinear optimization. In an even moderately large nonlinear opti-
mization problem, the contract space is too large to explore exhaustively. If we have
only 10 issues with 10 possible values per issue, for example, this produces a space of
1010 (10 billion) possible contracts. As a result, with limited computational resources,
we have no guarantee of finding the complete Pareto front. SFMP is presumably only
able to find a subset of the Pareto-optimal contracts, and those are scattered over the
entire frontier. Because the coverage is sparse, SFMP will often not happen to find the
Pareto-optimal contract that optimizes the fairness metric. This will reduce the average
fairness score for SFMP. NPMS, by contrast, devotes it’s entire computational effort to
finding a single Nash-product-maximizing contract. Even though it is an inferior opti-
mization objective, it has the benefit of a more concentrated application of computing
resources.
This interpretation is supported by Fig. 7, which shows the utility values for SFMP
and NPMS for a case with two agents and five issues, with randomly generated non-
linear utility functions. The red points show the contracts considered by NPMS, while
the blue points show the contracts considered by SFMP. Since SFMP aims to find the
entire Pareto front, it searches throughout the Pareto frontier. NPMS, by contrast, aims
to find the contract that directly maximizes the Nash product, so it focuses it’s search
toward the middle of the Pareto frontier. As Fig. 7 shows, SFMP in this case got closer
to the Pareto frontier than NPMS.
Figure 8 compares the failure rates across the six methods, to assess their scalability
of our methods. For all the methods, if the computing time method exceeded 100 s,
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Fig. 7 Comparison between SFMP and Nash product maximization search
Fig. 8 Comparison of failure rate
the negotiation was aborted and it was treated as a failure. The failure rate for the bid-
ding-based and exhaustive search protocols increased exponentially with the number
of issues. This is because that the computational complexity of finding agreements in
these protocols is quite large. All the other protocols had negligible failure rates.
The key experimental results can be summarized as follows:
– SFMP, as predicted, maximizes social welfare more effectively than NPMS. It also
out-performs the bidding-based protocol.
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– “SFMP” finds fairer contracts than the “Bidding-based protocol”, but is less fair
than NPMS.
– “SFMP” has a lower failure rate (and thus greater scalability) than the “Bidding-
based Protocol”.
We also found that the negotiation methods were sensitive to the complexity of nego-
tiation setting, due to the combinatorics of the local search algorithms they employed.
The larger the number of issues, the lower the optimality of the outcomes.
5 Related Work
There has been some recent work on agent privacy in distributed constraint optimiza-
tion problems (DCOP) field (Greenstadt et al. 2006; Maheswaran et al. 2005). Even
though negotiation seems to involve a straightforward constraint optimization problem,
we have been unable to exploit existing work on high efficiency constraint optimizers.
Such solvers attempt to find the solutions that maximize the weights of the satisfied
constraints, but they do not account for the fact that agents are all self-interested.
Klein et al. (2003) proposed a mediated protocol that uses simulated annealing to
achieve near-optimal outcomes with binary issue interdependencies in large contract
spaces. This work was limited, however, to bilateral negotiations.
Ito et al. (2007) proposed a bidding-based protocol for negotiation with multiple
interdependent issues. In this protocol, agents generate bids by sampling their utility
functions, and the mediator finds the optimum combination of submitted bids from
agents. Marsa-Maestre et al. (2009a, b) proposed a mechanism that balances utility
and deal probability for the bidding and deal identification processes. This mecha-
nism improves the solution optimality and scalability compared with bidding-based
protocols. Fujita et al. (2008b) proposed a protocol where the mediator selects repre-
sentatives who propose alternatives to other agents. This protocol increases scalability
by reducing in effect the number of agents who have to come to an agreement. These
protocols, however, focus on finding high social welfare contracts and don’t consider
fairness and Nash-bargaining solution features.
Ponsati and Watson (1997) proposed four procedures (global bargaining, sepa-
rate bargaining, simultaneous implementation, and independent implementation) by
which the bargaining may take place in two-person, multiple-issue bargaining prob-
lems. Kraus and Schechter (2003) considered a model of bilateral negotiation, but in
a complete information setting. Their work focuses mostly on examining agent strat-
egies when one agent loses utility over time, while the other gains utility over time.
These papers all focus, in addition, on bilateral multi-issue negotiations., while the
work reported in this paper focuses on negotiations among more than two agents.
Lin and Chou (2003) explored a range of protocols based on mutation and selec-
tion over binary contracts. This paper does not describe what kind of utility function
is used, nor does it present any experimental analyses, so it remains unclear whether
this strategy enables sufficient exploration of utility space. Barbuceanu and Lo (2000)
presented an approach based on constraint relaxation. However, this paper provides
no experimental analysis and merely presents a small toy problem with 27 contracts.
Debenham (2004) proposed a multi-issue bargaining strategy that models iterative
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information gathering that takes place during negotiation. However, these models
are not explicitly designed to address the problem of complex and high dimensional
negotiations. Klein et al. (2003) presented a protocol applied with near optimal results
to medium-sized bilateral negotiations with binary dependencies. This work demon-
strated both scalability and high optimality values for multilateral negotiations and
higher order dependencies.
Lai et al. (2006a, b) presented a protocol for multi-issue problems for bilateral
negotiations. Robu et al. (2005), Robu and Poutre (2006) presented a multi-item and
multi-issue negotiation protocol for bilateral negotiations in electronic commerce sit-
uations. Gerding et al. (2006) proposed a negotiation mechanism where the bargaining
strategy is decomposed into a concession strategy and a Pareto-search strategy. How-
ever, these papers also focuse on bilateral multi-issue negotiations.
Shew and Larson (2008) proposed multi-issue negotiation that employs a third-
party as a mediator to guide agents toward equitable solutions. This framework also
employs an agenda that serves as a schedule for the ordering of issue negotiation.
Agendas are very interesting because agents only need to focus on a few issues. This
paper also focuses on bilateral negotiations, however, this framework can apply to the
negotiations among more than two agents.
Jonker et al. (2007) proposed a negotiation model called ABMP that can be char-
acterized as cooperative one-to-one multi-criteria negotiation in which the privacy
of both parties is protected as much as desired. Hindriks et al. (2006) proposed an
approach based on a weighted approximation technique to simplify the utility space.
The resulting approximated utility function without dependencies can be handled by
negotiation algorithms that can efficiently deal with independent multiple issues and
have a polynomial time complexity (Jonker and Treur 2001). Hindriks et al. (2008)
proposed a checking procedure to mitigate this risk and showed that by tuning this pro-
cedure’s parameters, outcome deviation can be controlled. These studies reflect inter-
esting viewpoints, but they only focused on bilateral trading or negotiations. These
approaches is efficient, however, the utility function of this approaches is different
from the one based on multi-dimensional contstraints.
Fatima et al. (2007a, b) proposed bilateral multi-issue negotiations with time con-
straints. This method can find approximate equilibrium in polynomial time where the
utility function is nonlinear. However, these papers focused on bilateral multi-issue
negotiations. Li et al. (2009) proposed a method in which the mediator searches for
a compromise direction based on an Equal Directional Derivative approach and com-
putes a new tentative agreement in bilateral multi-issue negotiations. However, this
method only focused on multilateral negotiation.
6 Conclusions
We show, in this paper, that the Nash Bargaining Solution, although provably optimal
for negotiations with linear utilities, can lead to sub-optimal outcomes when applied
to nonlinear negotiations. We also present the Secure and Fair Mediator Protocol
(SFMP), a novel negotiation protocol that utilizes a combination of nonlinear optimi-
zation, secure information sharing, and an approximated fairness metric, and demon-
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strate that it achieves higher social welfare values than a protocol based on searching
for the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, we demonstrate that SFMP out-performs
our own previous efforts to enable multi-lateral negotiations in complex domains.
Future work includes building protocols that can find Pareto-optimal contracts more
quickly, making them more scalable, and increasing the fairness performance. One
potential approach to this problem is to focus the search efforts of the mediators more
closely on the fair portion of the Pareto frontier. We plan to investigate incentive-
compatibility issues in more detail, to ensure that the protocol can not be “gamed” by
agents seeking to gain disproportionate influence or to sabotage the outcomes. Finally,
we plan to explore the consequences of the fact that nonlinear problems, unlike linear
ones, can produce situations where you have to decide if social welfare or fairness is
more important. We will explore protocols that can deal with this situation somehow,
for example for giving negotiators the Pareto front and letting them bargain using
traditional iterative concession techniques.
Appendix 1: Secure Value Gathering
Appendix 1 below includes an explanation of secure value gathering. Figure 9 shows
an example with three agents and two mediators (k = 2). This is just for illustrative
purposes: in practical situations, k should be larger to reduce the likelihood of mediator
collusion. In the following, ui is agent i’s utility value.
1. The mediators ask the agents to generate “shares” v. Each agent Ai will send one
share vi, j to each mediator M j .
Fig. 9 The example of secure value gathering
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2. Each agent i(Ai ) randomly selects a k dimensional polynomial formula which
fulfills fi (0) = ui , In Fig. 9, for example, agent 1 selected f1(x) = a1x + u1,
agent 2 selected f2(x) = a2x + u2 and agent 3 selected f3(x) = a3x + u3.
3. Each agent (Ai ) calculates a share vi, j = fi ( j) for each mediator (M j ) and sends
it to that mediator. For example, agent A1’s share for mediator M2 would be v1,2
= f1(2) = 2a1 + u1.
4. Every mediator j (M j ) sums the shares v1, j , . . . , vn, j it receives from the agents
in order to calculate v j = v1, j + · · · + vn, j . In Fig. 9, for example, mediator 1
received the shares v1,1, v2,1, and v3,1 and calculated v1 = v1,1 + v2,1 + v3,1.
5. The j mediators add their share sums v j together to calculate F(x) for x from
1 to j . Using Lagrange’s interpolating polynomial, it is then straightforward to
calculate F(0), which corresponds to the sum of all the agent’s utility values for
a contract. The net result is that the social welfare is calculated without any one
mediator knowing the utility of any contract for any individual agent.
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